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G2

HEADQUARTERS
BERLIN BRIGADE
Office of the AC of S, G2

G2 DIVISION, BERLIN BRIGADE
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
Period Ending-302400 Nov 61
(ISUM #1) (U)

1. (S) SOVIET FORCES:

a. Soviet labor was used in the construction of the observation tower in East Germany opposite McNair Barracks, US Sector Berlin. Tower is similar to others around sector/sector and sector/zonal borders, approximately 60 feet high with platforms at 15 feet and 30 feet levels. Construction appears to be completed.

COMMENT: Nearest Soviet unit is the 178th Independent Guards Battalion. Tower probably Soviet observation post to permit observation of US company size exercises and other activities in and around McNair Barracks.

b. Ground reconnaissance of HENNICKENDORF forest assembly area at UT 7278 uncovered extensive network of new vehicle dugouts. Networks tied-in by elaborate underground communication cables.

c. Installation 4231, KGH Kaserne, which houses a Soviet signal unit, served as a tank park for 41 T-54 tanks from late August to 23 September 61. These tanks departed the installation and exited East Berlin in the direction of Bernau. Speculation that the T-54 tanks now in Bebel's Platz and Installation 4154 might have come from Bernau has no real foundation. Tanks in these two locations were tracked from Berlin Biesdorf and Karlshorst on 27 Oct 61. No tracks were observed leading from Installation 4231 or from Bernau. The 68th Guards Tank Regiment and the 83d Motorized Rifle Regiment have 128 T-54 tanks between them. Most probably the tanks in Bebel's Platz and Installation 4154 are subordinate to the 83d and the 68th.

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2. (C) EAST GERMAN ARMY FORCES:

a. Recent significant activities among East German forces include:

(1). Subordination of the BSP to the Ministry of Defense, and redesignation as Border Command (BC).

(2). Recall of selected reservists for the Berder Command.

(3). Temporary cancellation of discharges, at least for unmarried personnel until the spring of 1962.

(4). Withdrawal of EGA units from alert positions in East Berlin and in the vicinity of the West Berlin border.

(5). Increased number of joint Soviet/EGA exercises. While all of the above activities indicate that the East Germans are increasing the combat potential and readiness of their military forces, the list is more indicative of defense preparations for isolation of East Germany and East Berlin and possibly West Berlin from the western world than it is an indication of preparations for offensive warfare.

(6). At least two months will be required before the newly inducted personnel can be considered adequately trained and integrated into combat units. Until this has occurred, the East German military forces cannot be considered at full combat strength.

b. Three (3) Mechanized Rifle Divisions and two (2) Tank Divisions are capable of moving into the Berlin area in a very short time. A Tank Division asleep in a compound is given the capability of clearing the compound in 4 hours after being alerted. A Motorized Rifle Division could probably clear in about $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 hours. Tank Divisions can complete a river crossing such as the Elbe in 11 hours. A Motorized Rifle Division can cross in about 8 hours.

3. (S) GARRISON SECURITY FORCES:

The SGP "regiment" (actually a brigade) is composed of six battalions, all of which are located in East Berlin. The current strength of the SGP is estimated to be 4,500 men. They are well trained and equipped and are politically the most reliable of all East German military forces. Only one SGP member has defected to the West since 15 August.

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4. (S) RECAPITULATION OF SOVIET, EGA AND EAST GERMAN GARRISONED SECURITY FORCES:

a. Units locally available in the Berlin area:

<u>FORCE</u>	<u>UNIT SIZE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
EGA	1 Motorized Rifle Div (V Mil Dist)	9,200	
	1 Guard Regiment (GHQ)	800	
			10,000
SAP	2 Brigades totalling 16 Battalions	9,000	
SGP	1 Brigade of 6 Battalions	4,500	
KG	At least 12 Battalions and miscellaneous companies	25,000	
			38,500
GSFG	2 Motorized Rifle Div (6th & 19th)	22,800	
	1 Tank Division (10th)	9,000	
	1 Artillery Division (GSFG Trps)	4,000	
			35,800
	TOTAL	84,300	

b. GSFG Reserves and Reinforcements: The uncommitted units of 20th Guards Army, now listed as locally available, would be available as reserves. Elements of the remaining five armies of the GSFG are available as reinforcements. Similarly the two Soviet divisions in Poland, Soviet Forces in Western Military Districts of USSR and Satellite forces other than East German would be considered in this role. However, none of these forces are necessary to isolate or seize Berlin. Therefore, it is estimated that the above listed reinforcement capability would assume significance only in the event of limited or general war.

5. (C) ACCESS SITUATION:

a. (C) Railways:

Reports indicate East German S-Bahn employees working in West Berlin will be denied passes to enter West Berlin on or before 15 December 61. (F-3)

COMMENT: Report lends credence to previous information that all East Zone S-Bahn employees would be reassigned from duties in West Berlin before 1 January 62.

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Para 5 (C) (cont)

b. (C) Autobahn:

Photograph coverage of the Babelsburg barriers shows the following changes: North portion of barrier, which is closest to Berlin, has been removed except for the post in center of each half of autobahn and the barrier across center grass strip. A hole estimated to be 4 x 7 ft, depth unknown, has been dug just north of the barrier across center grass strip. Also, small holes estimated to be 1 x 2 feet, depth unknown, have been dug just north of the post in the center of each half of the autobahn. There was no significant change in the remainder of the barriers at the checkpoint.

c. (C) East Berlin:

According to USAREUR source, East German Communist Party functionaries claim number of West Germans visiting East Berlin has noticeably increased and that most visitors have no legitimate reason such as visiting relatives. Visitors suspected of black marketing, smuggling, espionage and subversion. One functionary suggested institution of preliminary application including personal data and reason for visit. (B-2)

COMMENT: Probably true that SED functionaries using visit of West Germans in East Berlin for propaganda purposes. Not considered likely that further restrictions against such visits will be imposed. Similar restrictions caused Inter-Zonal Trade abrogation by West Germany one year ago. East Germany is still in need of West German products although efforts underway to make East German economy eventually fully independent of Western and especially West German imports.

Visits to East Berlin by West Berliners has come to a virtual halt due to absence of accessible facilities for West Berliners to obtain visiting passes.

6. (C) HOSTILE RECONNAISSANCE:

Hostile reconnaissance patrols continue to maintain surveillance of installations in the American Sector of West Berlin. The approximate average continues to be about 4 Soviet vehicles per day.

7. (C) REFUGEES:

During this period, an approximate average of 29 refugees per day were processed at the Marienfelde Refugee Center. This is a slight increase since the last reporting period.

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8. (C) POPULATION ATTITUDES

East Berlin public are tending more and more to believe that Western Allies are willing to sacrifice East Berlin and East Germany in order to maintain their position in West Berlin. General public in East Berlin primarily concerned with direct personal effects of Allied moves in Berlin question. Even recent US action to escort US vehicles into East Berlin, which temporarily raised East Berlin public's hopes, now viewed as move designed to protest US interests only and not as one designed to eliminate restrictions on free travel between East and West Berlin.

9. (C) PROPAGANDA:

Newspapers, leaflets, posters and placards continue to be distributed within West Berlin by Communist organization members. Propaganda themes are varied, but continue to center mainly on the old themes, such as, "Western Provocations", and "a Free, Demilitarized City".

10. (C) OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS:

The following changes along the sector/sector border have occurred since 25 Nov 61:

(1). The screen erected in front of the concrete wall to the west of the Brandenburg Gate was taken down. A fence approximately four feet high was erected behind the Brandenburg Gate near the first intersection. There is an opening in the south end of the fence large enough for a vehicle to pass through. The fence is constructed of small pipe and would serve as a barrier only to small vehicles.

(2). At Potsdamer Platz the heavy mesh nets were taken down.

(3). At the Friedrichstrasse crossing point, a picket fence approximately five feet high, with two inch square wooden slats, two inches apart with a sharp point on top, was erected extending east from the south baffle to the corner of the first building, a distance of approximately one hundred feet.

COMMENT: The purpose of this fence is primarily to control pedestrian traffic at the crossing point.

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11. (C) NEW MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION:

During this period there were no new material identifications made; however, it has been noted that a sizeable increase of radar equipment has appeared within East Germany. The types and capabilities of the radar equipment is unknown at this time.

12. (C) NEW UNIT IDENTIFICATION:

No new unit identifications were made during this period.

13. (C) AIR:

The East German Air Force can support locally available forces with all or elements of approximately 200 jet fighters, of which one-fourth have an all-weather capability and 10 to 20 an air-to-air missile launch capability. Support aircraft include 50 transports and 35 helicopters with a total single lift capability of 1,100 airborne troops.

14. (C) STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

During this reporting period, there were 21 ground reconnaissance patrols dispatched to East Berlin; 49 Staff Tours were made in East Berlin; 5 helicopter flights were made over the sector/sector and sector/zonal borders; 3 helicopter photographic reconnaissance missions were flown over the ~~Marienborn~~ ^{Isabersburg} Checkpoint; 14 ground reconnaissance patrols were made of the sector/sector border from the American side; and 7 ground reconnaissance patrols were made along the sector/zonal border.

15. (C) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

Information has been received which indicates that the principal announcer for radio station "OPS, the Real Voice of Information, located in East Berlin, is one William D. Adkins, alias John REED. Adkins is a former US serviceman who defected to the Soviets in Austria in January 1954. He fled to avoid arrest after having been discovered attempting to remove classified documents from a safe in his office. He was having marital difficulties and was heavily in debt.

Since his defection, Adkins has become a devout communist and has been active in communist propaganda broadcasting activities, particularly in East Berlin and East Germany. It was also reported that he had attempted to commit suicide several weeks ago, supposedly because of mental depression.

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15. (C) (Cont)

G2 COMMENT: This information answers a question that has been often asked since OPS first began broadcasting in early September: Who were the American personnel doing the announcing work? In view of his previous communist training and experience, it is no surprise that Adkins, or Reed as he more often calls himself, is involved in OPS broadcasts.

16. (S) MISCELLANEOUS:

a. (S) Logistics:

(1) (C) No distinction need be made between supplies held by Soviet and East German forces since all key items of supply are interchangeable, and in an emergency could be used by either force, regardless of the source. The Soviets would support East German forces by filling existing logistic gaps.

(2) (S) The following estimate of key items of supply available to EGA and Soviet forces in Berlin are tabulated from holdings on supply installations within a fifty mile radius of Berlin. They do not include the many supply installations located elsewhere in East Germany.

1

1 Class III and V:

<u>CLASS (Totals)</u>	<u>METRIC TONS</u>	<u>DIV. DAYS OF SUPPLY*</u>
V	133,174	509**
III	139,540	1213

Note:

* Divisional slice for a Front for average combat (includes air).
** "509 days" is probably at least 30 days low, as ammunition holdings for GSFG's 24th Tactical Air Army are not known, and therefore cannot be included. The ammo figures do not include the supply in the hands of the troops - about 5 days supply.

2 Class I:

Due to the lack of information on contents of ration depots, it is impossible to estimate the number of days supply available. However, within a fifty mile radius of Berlin there are a total of 17 military ration depots and 13 East German state reserve depots. There are possibly 7 more Class I depots under construction in this area.

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3. General:

It is estimated that existing Quartermaster supply facilities throughout East Germany have sufficient supplies on hand to meet the requirements of present forces for at least 30 days and probably longer.

(3) (C) Maintenance installations and mobile maintenance facilities presently available within a fifty mile radius of Berlin are more than adequate to maintain current forces. With sufficient raw materials, spare parts, these same facilities could increase their productivity by 50 to 70 percent.

(4) (C) Following are major depots located within a fifty (50) mile radius of Berlin:

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>TOWN LOCATION</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>
III	Berlin-Adlershof	VU 011095
III	Berlin-Rummelsburg (2)	UU 982158
		UU 974174
III	Kablow	VT 122963
III	Kleinbahren (2)	VT 136311
		VT 131292
III	Velten (2)	UU 779383
		UU 781388
V	Toepchen	VT 016803
V	Wilmersdorf	VT 405920
V	Wulkow	UU 603688
V	Altengrabow	UT 067860
V	Biesenthal	VU 103494
V	Dannenwalde	UU 770850
V	Eberswalde/Finow	VU 160567
V	Jueterbog	UT 606667
V	Buckau	UT 158897
V	Wolfsruh	UU 692810

b. (C) Steinstuecken Exclave:

On 281332 Nov 61, 2 male and 1 female refugees were flown out of Steinstuecken in conjunction with normal relief of the US Army Military Police patrol. The exchange took place without incident.

Status of public service remains unchanged.

19. (S) ITEMS OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST:

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
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It is estimated that the forthcoming months, possibly until the early spring of 1962, may be relatively quiet for Berlin, as Khrushchev seeks to determine the prospects of profitable negotiations with the West. As a minimum, he would like to gain public acceptance by the Western Allies of a divided Germany within existing frontiers, including a divided Berlin and an agreement looking forward to the ultimate end of the Western Allied occupation of West Berlin. Should Khrushchev come to believe that he cannot get enough worthwhile concession from the Western Allies through negotiations, he may conclude a separate peace treaty with the East Germans but with safeguards to forestall or delay forceful contact between the East Germans and the Western Allies in the matter of access. If and when clashes do occur, Khrushchev may hope to find a way out by taking the problem to the UN or otherwise internationalizing it, or by disengagement.

1 Incl
a/s


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EAST GERMAN ARMY TIME-DISTANCE MOVEMENT TABLE **
(Outlying Areas to Berlin) (U)

UNIT	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RAIL *		ROAD *	
			Kilo-meter	Time: Hr-Min	Kilo-meter	Time Hr-Min
<u>4th Mtz Rifle Div</u>						
22 Mtz Rif Regt	Muhlhausen	PB 035751	355	1010	260	1300
23 Mtz Rif Regt	Sondershausen	PB 307925	300	835	305	1515
4th Tk Regt	Gotha	PB 210433	290	825	315	1545
12 Arty Regt	Erfurt	PB 464489	270	710	285	1420
<u>8th Mtz Rifle Div</u>						
27 Mtz Rif Regt	Schwerin	PE 625378	215	610	215	1045
28 Mtz Rif Regt	Rostock	UV 098974	245	700	240	1200
29 Mtz Rif Regt	Prora	VA 075337	300	835	270	1330
<u>11th Mtz Rifle Div</u>						
16 Mtz Rif Regt	Leipzig	US 158943	160	435	165	815
17 Mtz Rif Regt	Halle	QC 072094	160	435	165	815
18 Mtz Rif Regt	Weissenfels	QB 088756	190	525	185	920
11 Tk Regt	Zeithain	US 833917	140	400	180	900
<u>7th Tank Div</u>						
14 Tk Regt	Spremberg	VT 583147	140	400	135	645
15 Tk Regt	Cottbus	VT 538321	115	315	120	600
16 Tk Regt	Loebau	VS 778620	235	645	230	1130
<u>9th Tank Div</u>	Eggesin	VV 389477	170	455	160	800

* Not necessarily the shortest distance, but the distance over routes most likely to be used if all units were moving simultaneously by the same mode of transportation.

** Representative locations only.

Highway: At rate of 20 KPH.

Rail: At 35 KPH.

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